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Regulatory and media concern has focused heavily on the potentially manipulative distortion of
market prices associated with naked short selling. However, naked shorting can also have beneficial effects for
liquidity and pricing efficiency. We empirically investigate the impact of naked short-selling on market
quality, and find that naked shorting leads to significant reduction in positive pricing errors, the volatility of
stock price returns, bid-ask spreads, and pricing error volatility. We study naked shorting surrounding the
demise of financial institutions hardest hit by the financial crisis in 2008 and find no evidence that stock price
declines were caused by naked shorting. We also find that naked short-selling intensifies after rather than
before credit downgrade announcements during the 2008 financial crisis. In general, we find that naked short
sellers respond to public news and intensify their activity after price declines rather than triggering these price
declines. We study the impact of the SEC ban on naked short selling of financial securities during July and
August 2008, and find that the ban did not slow the price decline of those securities and had a negative impact
on liquidity and pricing efficiency. Finally, after examining the speeds of mean reversion of pricing errors and
order imbalances, we infer that Regulation SHO was successful in curbing the impact of manipulative naked
short selling, and this reduction in the impact of manipulative naked shorting has continued through the 2008
financial crisis. Overall, our empirical results are in sharp contrast with the extremely negative pre-
conceptions that appear to exist among media commentators and market regulators in relation to naked short-
selling.
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1
Naked Short Selling: The Emperor’s New Clothes?
1. Brief Background and Motivation
Short selling is the sale of a stock not owned by the seller. Generally, the stock is
borrowed, or adequate borrowing arrangements are made, to ensure availability for delivery at
settlement. Such short selling is “covered shorting”. On the other hand, “naked short selling” or
“naked shorting” is a short sale in which the seller does not arrange to borrow, or even intend to
borrow the securities to deliver to the buyer within the standard three-day settlement period. As
a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the buyer when delivery is due (known as a
"failure to deliver" or “FTD”)
2.
Regulators have understandably sought to curb naked short selling given that regular,
intentional and widespread breach of settlement-related contractual delivery obligations can
potentially disrupt the smooth functioning of financial markets, even though the Depository
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) (electronic) system of a voluntary pool of lenders
mitigates such disruptions, and makes naked shorting costly
3. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), through Regulation SHO, accordingly imposed major restrictions on naked
short selling (like the locate requirement) effective from January 2005. More recently, in the
wake of the heavy and rapid falls in the prices of financial sector stocks during the current
financial crisis, there has been considerable concern about manipulative “bear raids” by naked
short-sellers, and US regulators banned naked short selling for select financial institutions
between July 21
st and August 12
th, 2008, since “false rumors can lead to a loss of confidence
[and] panic selling, which may be further exacerbated by ‘naked’ short selling”, and as a result,
“the prices of securities may artificially and unnecessarily decline well below the price level that
would have resulted from the normal price discovery process”
4. In a similar spirit, Britain’s
Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposed new regulations on short positions, and restrictive
regulations on shorting were enacted in many other countries
5. On the other hand, there have
also been concerns about such restrictions, since short-sellers play “an important role in
2 Our definition of “naked short sale” follows from the SEC Division of Market Regulation note “Key Points about
Regulation SHO”, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm.
3 Culp and Heaton (2007) provide an excellent overview of the DTCC system in this context.
4 Security Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 58166 / July 15, 2008.
5 The list of countries which have recently imposed new restrictions on either short selling or naked short selling
includes Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, Germany, Luxemburg, Russia, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong
and Taiwan (“Regulating Short Selling”, Financial Times, September 23, 2008).2
exposing the poor condition of some companies” and that “neither of the regulators has
produced evidence [linking naked short selling to market manipulation] so far”
6.
Contemporaneously, there has been a surge of discussion in the media about the impact
of naked shorting. Over 4,600 printed articles have appeared in English-language magazines and
newspapers discussing naked shorting in the past 2 years
7. Of these, an extremely tiny minority
depicts naked shorting as beneficial to market quality
8. The vast majority focuses on the
potential for stock price manipulation and on the creation of phantom shares
9. Other evidence of
the current views against naked shorting include at least three investor associations lobbying for
restrictions on naked shorting
10, at least three lawsuits by investor groups alleging stock price
manipulation linked to naked shorting
11 and at least twelve other lawsuits against the DTCC for
allegedly facilitating naked short selling. Several senior managers of major companies targeted
by naked short sellers have also been very vocal in their opposition to naked shorting, claiming
that naked shorting led to their stock prices being artificially depressed
12. The SEC has received
over 5,000 complaints alleging stock price manipulation through naked short selling between
January 2007 and June 2008
13.
However, it can also be forcefully argued that both covered and naked shorting should be
beneficial for pricing efficiency and for liquidity. First, both covered and naked short-selling
should potentially contribute to the price discovery process by enabling value-traders to more
quickly and easily bring the prices of overpriced securities in line with their “true value”, as
argued by Miller (1977) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), among others. And second,
financial intermediaries and other liquidity suppliers should be able to provide liquidity more
6 “Naked Fear”, The Economist (July 24, 2008).
7 We used the Factiva Database to search for the term ‘naked short selling’, restricting our search to publications in
English over the period 8/10/2006-8/10/2008.
8 One rare example is “Don’t Force the Shorts to Get Dressed”, Business Week (Dec. 8, 2003).
9 While the SEC and the DTCC deny the possibility of phantom shares arising from failed trades, many
commentators disagree. Former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt has often made the link between FTDs and phantom
shares, for example by claiming (as per Welborn, 2008) that “phantom shares created by naked shorting are
analogous to counterfeit money”. See also Culp and Heaton (2007) for more detailed discussion in this regard.
10 The Movement for Market Reform, the National Coalition Against Naked Short Selling (NCANS) and the
Coalition for the Reform of Regulation SHO.
11 The Biovail lawsuit against Stephen Cohen, Gradient, and a host of others; the Overstock lawsuit against Rocker
Partners, Gradient, and a host of others; and The NFI lawsuit brought by NFI shareholders against Bank of America
(the Specialist) and the Prime Brokers.
12 Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, has been very vocal in this regard and has been lobbying for new
regulations against naked short selling, while the corporation itself has initiated lawsuits against both naked short
sellers and financial institutions accused of facilitating naked short selling (http://www.overstock.com/naked-short-
selling.html). More recently, Bear Stearns CEO Alan Schwartz, Morgan Stanly CEO John Mack and Lehman
Brothers CEO Richard Fuld have all blamed naked short sellers for price declines of their stock.
13 “Naked short sales provoke complaints”, The Wall Street Journal Asia (March 20, 2009). In this context, for
example, in 2003, the SEC settled a case against parties accused of manipulating stocks through naked short selling:
SEC v. Rhino Advisors Inc. and Thomas Badian, Feb. 26, 2003.3
effectively and expeditiously in the presence of both covered and naked short-selling. While one
would expect naked shorting to be at least as beneficial as covered shorting in this context, and
arguably more so, the SEC has, because of the fear of manipulative naked shorting, relaxed
covered-shorting restrictions but increased naked-shorting restrictions, through, for example, the
“locate” and “close-out” requirements under Regulation SHO, removal of the uptick rule, and
the temporary naked shorting “bans” during the 2008 financial crisis
14.
There is a significant body of literature focusing on the impact on market quality of short
selling. This literature largely suggests and does actually find that short-selling is potentially
beneficial both for pricing efficiency and liquidity
15, but also offers evidence linking short
selling to price manipulation
16. However, this literature does not distinguish between covered
and naked short-selling. In particular, existing research does not provide any evidence
specifically on the effect of naked shorting on liquidity, price distortions and pricing efficiency,
and the extent to which the effects of naked shorting exist after controlling for covered-shorting.
Our study fills this void in existing literature.
Using data on fails to deliver for the first half of 2007
17, we estimate that naked shorting
has affected about 91% of NYSE securities, about 71% of NASDAQ securities and about 60%
of AMEX and ARCA securities. Using a random sample of 300 NYSE securities, and a vector
autoregressive model to control for causality and endogenous interrelationships between market
quality metrics, we find that an increase in naked short selling leads to lower positive pricing
errors, lower pricing error volatility, reduced stock price volatility and lower order imbalances.
We also observe that naked short selling intensifies after positive order imbalances. These
results are consistent with market makers employing naked short selling to provide liquidity
when it is otherwise scarce and value arbitrageurs enhancing pricing efficiency through naked
short selling. As we are more likely to find negative effects associated with naked short selling
when it is most intense, we also focus on a sample of the most naked shorted securities. Even in
14 The “locate” requirement obligates a broker-dealer to have, before executing a short sale order, reasonable
grounds to believe that the security can be borrowed for timely delivery. The "close-out" requirement imposes
additional delivery obligations on broker-dealers for “threshold” securities with a relatively high number of FTDs.
15 Theoretical models predicting a beneficial impact of short-selling on market quality include Miller, (1977),
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) and Scheinkmann and Xiong (2003).
Empirical studies supporting those theories include, among others, Harrison and Kreps (1978), Pope and Yadav
(1994), Asquith and Meulbroek (1996), Aitken et al. (1998), Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), Jones and Lamont
(2002), Gezy et. al. (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003), Daouk and Charoenrook (2005), Reed (2007), Bris et. al.
(2007), Boehmer et al. (2008).
16 For example, Shkilko et al. (2008) offers evidence that short-selling is often used as a tool for price manipulation
and thus destabilizes prices.
17 Data on fails to deliver has recently been made public by the SEC under the Freedom of Information Act. Data
on FTDs provided by the SEC is available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata-archive.htm4
this sample, we find a positive impact on market quality: a one percentage point increase in the
incidence of naked short selling leads to approximately a 2.8% reduction in returns volatility, a
1% reduction in bid-ask spreads, a 4.3% decline in pricing error volatility and a 4.6 % decline in
positive pricing errors.
Since naked short sellers have been widely accused in the media for having contributed
to the financial crisis by precipitating manipulative price declines of financial firms in 2008, we
analyze a few high-profile individual cases of financial firms that experienced dramatic stock
price declines. In particular, we analyze naked short selling in Bear Sterns Companies Inc. (Bear
Stearns), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman), Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (Merrill), and
American Insurance Group (AIG). We find that, except for one instance in June 2008 of
possible stock price manipulation through naked shorting in relation to Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., most of the time, naked short selling was too low to reasonably “cause”
significant stock price distortions, and when naked shorting did become abnormally heavy, it
was after dramatic price declines, not before, indicating that naked short sellers were responding
to public domain information about the firms, rather than being responsible for triggering the
observed precipitous price decline. We further analyze how naked short selling changes around
public news of credit rating downgrades, and again find that naked short selling increases after
rather than before the credit downgrade announcement, again consistent with naked short sellers
responding to public information, rather than being responsible for triggering price declines.
We also analyze the market impact of the SEC naked short selling ban for 19 financial
securities between July 15 and August 12, 2008. For the period during which the ban was
enacted, we find significantly higher absolute pricing errors and significantly lower trading
volumes, indicating that the naked short selling ban hampered price discovery and reduced
liquidity. Returns, albeit negative, were not significantly affected, indicating that the ban failed
to slow the price decline of the related securities.
Finally, we examine changes in the impact of manipulative naked shorting, in contrast to
naked shorting that improves pricing efficiency or liquidity. We find that negative pricing errors
and negative order imbalances mean-revert at a significantly faster rate after Regulation SHO,
indicating a lower impact of manipulative naked short selling after Regulation SHO; and
importantly, this reduced impact of manipulative naked shorting has continued through the 2008
financial crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews extant
research on naked short selling. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 defines the
measures and variables we use for naked and covered shorting, pricing efficiency, and liquidity.5
Section 5 documents our empirical methods and results: provides salient descriptive statistics;
investigates the impact of naked shorting on market quality; analyzes the role of naked short
sellers around major economic events over the financial crisis period, e.g., the demise of Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the near-demise of Merrill and AIG, and around credit rating
downgrade announcements; examines the impact of the ban on naked short selling of select
financial securities in July and August 2008, and analyzes changes in the impact of manipulative
naked short-selling in the context of Regulation SHO and the 2008 financial crisis. Section 6
presents concluding remarks.
2. Extant Research on Naked Short-Selling
A large body of existing research examines the relation between short selling and market
quality. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) conclude, on the basis of their theoretical model, that
short-selling constraints do not bias prices upwards, but reduce the speed of adjustment of prices
to private information, and hence reduce pricing efficiency. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002,
2003) and Scheinkmann and Xiong (2003) show theoretically that constraints on short selling
are linked to bubbles and excess market volatility. Early studies supporting the view that short
selling reduces overpricing and increases market efficiency include Miller (1977) and Harrison
and Kreps (1978). Pope and Yadav (1994) find that spot-market short-selling restrictions make
index futures more negatively mispriced, leading to a pricing bias. Asquith and Meulbroek
(1996), Aitken et al. (1998), Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), Jones and Lamont (2002), Gezy et.
al. (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Reed (2007) provide evidence that stock prices do
not fully incorporate information in the presence of short sale constraints. Daouk and
Charoenrook (2005) study the effects of changing restrictions on short selling in 111 countries
and conclude that allowing short selling improves market quality. Bris et. al. (2007) similarly
analyze equity markets around the world and find that prices incorporate negative information
faster in markets where short sales are allowed. Diether et al. (2007) document that the
temporary suspension of the uptick rule that restricted short-selling did not negatively affect
market quality, and conclude that the suspension can be made permanent
18. Boehmer et al.
(2008) use proprietary NYSE order data to find that short sellers are, on average, better
informed, and contribute to efficient pricing. Shkilko et al. (2008) focus on short selling during
intraday liquidity crises and observe that short-sellers have price-destabilizing effects: they
18 Later on the SEC did actually permanently suspend the uptick rule.6
conclude that short-selling is often used as a tool for price manipulation and short selling
restrictions would improve market quality.
The literature focusing specifically on naked short selling is much less developed. There
are two academic “thought-pieces” without any theoretical models or empirical evidence:
Christian et al. (2006) provide a descriptive review of naked shorting from a legal perspective;
and, Uchimoto et. al. (2005) discuss the impact of naked short selling on ETF trading,
conjecturing adverse impacts on capital formation and pricing efficiency, particularly for small
and emerging companies. There are also two theoretical papers on naked shorting without any
empirical evidence. Finnerty (2005) develops a theoretical model for market equilibrium in the
presence of short selling, both covered and naked shorting, and concludes that naked short
selling is likely to be used as an instrument for market manipulation. On the other hand, Culp
and Heaton (2007) offer a theoretical model of the effects of naked shorting on markets, and, in
the context of an extensive analysis of the DTCC settlement system, conclude that “naked
shorting is not fundamentally different from traditional short selling and is unlikely to have
detrimental effects on capital markets”.
We are aware of three empirical studies specifically on naked shorting. First, Evans et al.
(2008) use data from one market maker to link FTDs to hard-to-borrow situations and examine
the possibility of arbitrage based on misalignments between the option and stock markets.
Second, Boni (2006) analyzes delivery failures in U.S. equity markets. She finds that, prior to
Regulation SHO, most U.S. equity issues, listed and unlisted, experienced at least a small
percentage of failures-to-deliver each day. A substantial fraction of issues (42% of listed stocks
and 47% of unlisted stocks) had persistent fails of 5 days or more. She conjectures that
Regulation SHO would lead to less liquidity, increased price volatility and temporary short
squeezes, but does not offer any empirical evidence on the issue
19. And third, Edwards and
Hanley (2008) examine the effect of short selling constraints and of naked short selling on the
short-term performance of IPOs, and find that IPOs with greater naked shorting are more
accurately priced.
However, we are not aware of any empirical research that investigates the link between
naked shorting and market quality: we fill this gap in the literature with the present paper. Our
aim is to empirically investigate naked shorting in the context of manipulative price distortions,
pricing efficiency and liquidity; and thereby offer insights into the tradeoff market regulators
19 Merrick, Naik and Yadav (2005) provide evidence that suggests that the “right to fail” provides an important
release valve for settlement related pressures and limits the damage a potential squeezer can cause. This generates
another perspective on the potential problems that can arise from restricting naked short selling.7
face. Our expectation is that naked short selling potentially increases the risk of manipulative
episodes, but also leads to an improvement in market quality by reducing pricing efficiency and
increasing liquidity.
3. Development of Hypotheses
As highlighted in the introduction and the footnotes therein, the media and the CEOs of
affected firms have vociferously and persistently accused naked short-sellers of undertaking
“bear raids” and thereby causing associated stock prices to decline. Regulators have also
sometimes accused naked short sellers of depressing stock prices
20. Accordingly, our first
hypothesis is the following:
H1: Naked short selling depresses stock prices.
While the large body of literature that has examined the relationship between short sales
and pricing efficiency has sometimes documented contrasting results, a growing consensus is
emerging that short sellers enhance price efficiency. Two recent studies are especially relevant
here. First, Diether et al. (2007) use the recently available data on daily short sales to find that
short sellers correct overreaction in stock prices. Second, Boehmer et al. (2008) use proprietary
NYSE order data to find that short sellers, especially institutional short sellers, act as value
arbitragers and correct overpriced securities to bring about permanent price effects and hence
contribute to efficient pricing. While there is no empirical evidence in regard to naked short
selling, Culp and Heaton (2007) argue that naked and covered short sales should have similar
impacts on security markets. Similar to a covered short sale, a naked short sale (which
eventually leads to a FTD) starts off with a short seller agreeing to sell a security to a buyer at
the prevailing market price; but, unlike a covered short sale, the naked short seller fails to deliver
the security to the buyer (on day t+3) because she has not borrowed the security from a lender
21.
Ordinarily, the DTCC system triggers immediate delivery to the buyer through borrowing from
a voluntary pool of lenders, and even where the pool is empty, the buyer, by holding the selling
price of the stock as collateral and also maintaining an exposure to the security, effectively
becomes the lender of the security to the naked shorter. Accordingly, Culp and Heaton (2007)
argue that, except for this nuance of a change in roles, covered and naked short sales are
20 For example, Robert J. Shapiro, former undersecretary of commerce for economic affairs, claims that naked short
selling costs investors $100 billion and has driven 1,000 companies into the ground (“Watch Out, They Bite!”, Time
Magazine (November 9, 2005)).
21 Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) note that since equity loans settle on T+0 and short sales settle on T+3, short
sellers normally borrow only on T+3. Hence, at inception, a covered and a naked short sale are, usually,
indistinguishable. The distinction only becomes apparent at settlement.8
functionally indistinguishable. In view of this functional similarity, and the emerging consensus
of an improvement in price discovery associated with short selling in general, our hypothesis is:
H2: Naked short selling reduces positive pricing errors.
Given that we know from Hasbrouck (1993) that informationally efficient markets
display lower dispersion of pricing errors, our hypothesis is:
H3: Naked short selling reduces the volatility of pricing errors.
Naked short selling is often employed by market makers and other liquidity providers to
quickly and efficiently fulfill orders. The SEC accordingly asserts on its website that “in certain
circumstances, naked short selling contributes to market liquidity. For example, broker-dealers
that make a market in a security generally stand ready to buy and sell the security on a regular
and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price, even when there are no other buyers or sellers.
Thus, market makers must sell a security to a buyer even when there are temporary shortages of
that security available in the market. This may occur, for example, if there is a sudden surge in
buying interest in that security, or if few investors are selling the security at that time. Because it
may take a market maker considerable time to purchase or arrange to borrow the security, a
market maker engaged in bona fide market making, particularly in a fast-moving market, may
need to sell the security short without having arranged to borrow shares. This is especially true
for market makers in thinly traded, illiquid stocks”
22. In fact, naked short selling is a mechanism
to improve the efficiency of security-lending markets since the option to fail becomes
particularly valuable when borrowing is too expensive for covered short sellers, which is exactly
when liquidity is most needed (Evans, Geczy, Musto and Reed, 2008). In this context, we expect
naked short sales to increase liquidity (by decreasing bid-ask spreads) and to reduce order
imbalances. This leads us to our next set of hypotheses:
H4: Naked short selling reduces bid-ask spreads.
H5: Naked short selling reduces order imbalances.
We expect that improvements in both liquidity and pricing errors should translate into
more orderly and less volatile markets. Accordingly, we expect to observe lower stock price
volatility in the presence of naked shorting. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H6: Naked short selling reduces stock price volatility.
Naked short-sellers are typically thought of as undertaking “bear raids” to trigger
downward price spirals, and specifically with the aim of achieving credit downgrades so as to
22 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm9
also profit from simultaneous positions in the CDS market. In this context, we test the following
hypotheses:
H7A: Naked short-sellers triggered the price crashes associated with Bear Stearns,
Lehman, AIG and Merrill.
H7B: Naked short-sellers triggered credit downgrades.
We investigate the impact of SEC restrictions on naked short selling introduced in the
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Given that we expect naked short selling to improve liquidity,
reduce the volatility of pricing errors, and accelerate price declines, we expect restrictions on
naked short selling to have the opposite effect. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H8A: Restrictions on naked short selling reduce trading volumes.
H8B: Restrictions on naked short selling increase bid-ask spreads.
H8C: Restrictions on naked short selling increase pricing error volatility.
H8D: Restrictions on naked short selling increase returns.
We test the effect of Regulation SHO and the 2008 financial crisis on the impact of
manipulative naked short-selling. In this context, we note that naked short-sellers can have three
trading motivations. They could be value arbitrageurs aiming to profit from positive pricing
errors; or dealers or other traders aiming to profit from supplying liquidity (by selling when
order imbalances are positive and buying when they are negative); or the manipulative traders
that Regulation SHO was intended to curb and regulate. If Regulation SHO has been effective,
we would expect that the impact of manipulative naked shorting would have declined after
Regulation SHO, leaving only the beneficial effects on liquidity and pricing efficiency.
Furthermore, we would not expect any significant differences in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis.
It is difficult to precisely define the criteria that can be used to identify and classify
naked short-sellers as potentially manipulative. We define potentially manipulative naked short-
sellers from the mind-set used in the financial crisis media coverage of naked short-selling, i.e.,
the mindset of bear-raids, based on whether naked shorting is undertaken at a time when pricing
errors are positive or negative. If naked shorting is done when pricing errors are positive, it
contributes positively to pricing efficiency. If it is done when pricing errors are negative, then it
will arguably further amplify negative pricing errors in the next period, and thereby contribute to
generating a bear-raid scenario. Hence, we would expect that the mean reversion of pricing
errors, conditional on the pricing error being negative, will decrease in the presence of greater
manipulative naked shorting.10
We can apply similar criteria based on order imbalances. If naked shorting is done when
order imbalances are positive, naked shorting will arguably have a positive liquidity-related
impact. However, following the same mind-set of bear raids, naked short-selling will be
potentially manipulative if it is initiated at a time when order-imbalances are negative, since it
will cause them to become even more negative. Hence, once again, we would expect that the
mean reversion of order-imbalances, conditional on the order-imbalance being negative, will
decrease in the presence of greater manipulative naked shorting.
Accordingly we test whether:
H9A:Regulation SHO increases the rate of mean reversion of negative pricing errors.
H9B:Regulation SHO increases the rate of mean reversion of negative order imbalances.
H9C:The financial crisis does not change mean reversion of negative pricing errors.
H9D:The financial crisis does not change mean reversion of negative order imbalances.
4. Definitions of Measures and Variables
Table 1 summarizes the measures and variables we use in this paper. The measures and variables
related to short-selling and pricing error are explained in greater detail in this sub-section.
Liquidity measures and other variables in Table 1 are as commonly used in the literature.
4.1 Naked Short Selling
Our proxy for naked short selling is based on the outstanding number of fails to deliver
(FTDs), daily data on which has been made available by the SEC under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) since March 22, 2004
23. In this context, we note that, while every naked
short sale does, by definition, result in an FTD, every FTD does not necessarily originate from a
naked short sale. In particular, we can think of three specific factors that can make an FTD-
based proxy imperfect.
First, as highlighted by the SEC, “human or mechanical errors or processing delays can
result from transferring securities in physical certificate rather than book-entry form, thus
causing a FTD. However, we believe such errors and delays should be random and not
systematically related to any of our hypotheses and therefore may add noise but should not
affect any of our conclusions. Further, former SEC commissioner Roel Campos stated in an
23 The SEC dataset records outstanding fails to deliver only when the latter exceed 10,000 shares. We assume that,
when no FTDs are reported, the number of FTDs is equal to zero. Also, in the SEC data, each share not delivered is
counted twice, as the related failure to receive is recorded separately as well. Hence, to obtain a count of
outstanding FTDs, our first adjustment is to divide each entry in the series by two.11
interview that “The majority of these failures-to-deliver are not the result of honest mistakes or
bad processing”
24.
Second, Edwards and Hanley (2008) suggest that FTDs “in price supported IPOs may
arise from the mechanism of the offering process”. Accordingly, to avoid the possibility of IPO-
related FTDs, we exclude securities that started trading during our sample interval.
Third, it can be conjectured that a reported FTD may be caused by the trader that fails to
receive (and hence not caused by naked shorting). In this context, we note that Evans et al.
(2008) find that the number of FTDs is strongly related to rebate rates, indicating that FTDs
originate largely from (naked) short transactions; and Boni (2006) shows that the number of
FTDs is related to the number of short sales, and offers evidence that market makers
‘strategically’ fail to deliver when borrowing costs are high, again pointing to FTDs being
governed by (naked) short selling. Still, we undertake our own empirical analysis to more
formally test for this conjecture, and, consistent with extant research, do not find any support for
it. Specifically, as per the regression results we report in Table 2, we find that the number of new
FTDs each day is strongly and significantly related (p-value<<0.01) to the daily
contemporaneous trading volume arising from short sales (that includes and should arguably be
correlated with the number of naked shorts), and is not significantly related to the ‘non-short’
daily trading volume arising from regular sales (which should arguably be the source of any
FTDs that are driven by failures to receive)
25.
We accordingly proxy the intensity of naked short selling by an FTD-based measure: the
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) defined for each day T as the estimated cumulative
naked short sales till day T scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (obtained from
CRSP). To calculate the cumulative naked short sales till day T, we adjust the outstanding FTDs
data from SEC by adding the naked short sales that have already taken place but have not yet
been observed because they will show up only after settlements are duly completed over days
T+1, T+2 and T+3
26. We also compute the New Naked Short Ratio on day T as the number of
24 “Short Sellers Squeezed All Around”, The Wall Street Journal (April 7, 2009).
25 We use the Regulation SHO TAQ database for the first half of 2007 to obtain the total daily number of shares
traded and the total daily number of shares shorted, and thereby infer the ‘non-short’ daily trading volume arising
from regular sales. We run security-specific regressions of new FTDs on short volume and non-short volume, and
employ a Fama and MacBeth (1973) type procedure to aggregate and test for statistical significance. The results are
available upon request. For the sake of brevity, they are not included in the main text.
26 For each day T, the difference between cumulative FTDs on day T and cumulative FTDs on day T-1 is equal to
the number of new naked shorted shares minus the number of previously outstanding FTDs closed on day T. While
we do not have data on the number of previously outstanding FTDs settled on a particular day, we approximate it on
the basis of the Office for Economic Analysis memorandum dated August 21, 2006, “Fails to Deliver Pre- and Post-
Regulation SHO” and the assumption of constant settlement rates.12
new FTDs on day T divided by the number of shares traded on day T; and the Naked to All
Shorts Ratio as the ONSR divided by the short interest
27.
Finally, to additionally reassure ourself that our FTD-based ONSR measure is a good
proxy for naked shorting, we examine whether major time-series dips and surges in ONSR
correspond to periods during which we have good economic reason to independently expect
such dips and surges. Accordingly, Figure 1 presents a plot of market-wide average ONSR
across all securities, and cumulative S&P 500 index returns for 2007 and 2008. Two features are
immediately apparent. First, the low frequency crests in ONSR correspond roughly to the low
frequency troughs in cumulative S&P 500 index returns, and vice-versa. Second, and more
importantly, ONSR drops sharply in two periods where we would have independently expected
it to drop, and in at least the second period, the sharp drop cannot be related to returns since the
change in cumulative returns is in a direction opposite to what it is in other periods. Specifically,
ONSR drops sharply between July 21 and August 12, 2008 when the SEC heavily increased
restrictions on naked short-selling. And it drops sharply again between September 19 and
October 9, 2008, when the SEC banned short sales on 799 financial stocks. Clearly, Figure 1
provides strong independent support for our FTD-based ONSR measure being a good proxy for
naked short-selling.
4,672 NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ or ARCA securities have at least one FTD observation
exceeding 10,000 shares over our 2007 sample period, and constitute our sample of what we
hereafter refer to as “securities with naked shorts”. They represent about 91% of NYSE-listed
securities, 61% of AMEX securities, 71% of NASDAQ securities, and 60% of ARCA securities.
In order to control for the effects of covered short selling, we also compute the Covered
Short Ratio (CSR), the daily number of covered-shorted shares scaled by the daily trading
volume in shares. Covered-shorted shares are estimated as the difference between the total
number of shorted shares (obtained from the Regulation SHO data in TAQ) and the number of
new FTDs on the day.
4.2 Pricing Error
In order to examine the effect of naked short selling on pricing efficiency, we construct,
for each sample security, a daily estimate of information-efficient “random-walk” price in the
spirit of Hasbrouck (1993), specifically using a Kalman-filter based methodology as in Dong,
Kempf and Yadav (2008). The outline of the estimation model is as follows:
27 Monthly short interest data was obtained from www.shortsqueeze.com13
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information-efficient “random-walk” price, Y(t) is the pricing error defined as the difference
between the log of the observed price and the log of this information-efficient price, and α is the
rate of mean-reversion in pricing errors, i.e., the proportion of pricing error that is corrected over
one time period. α is expected to range between 0 and 1, with pricing errors corrected
instantaneously when α is equal to one and not corrected at all when α is equal to zero.
We accordingly calculate daily estimates of the Pricing Error for each day and each
sample security, using daily returns data from the CRSP database. We also calculate the other
pricing-error related variables from the Pricing Error as defined in Table 1.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Data and Samples
Our naked shorting measures are based on SEC FOIA data as described in Section 4.1
and are available from late March 2004 to end-2008. Our market quality measures are based on
NYSE TAQ data. We use TAQ short sales data released after Regulation SHO to control for
covered shorting. These daily short sales data are not available after June 30, 2007, and are
currently available only for securities whose primary exchange is the NYSE. Accordingly, we
confine ourselves hereafter to NYSE-listed securities, and our inferences relating to the impact
of naked shorting on market quality are first based on the 6-month time period January 1to June
30, 2007, where we are able to fully control for covered short sales. Since the computation of
market quality measures is very resource intensive, we select a random subset of securities for
in-depth analysis. We focus on common shares of US-listed securities (CRSP share codes 10
and 11) listed on the NYSE over the entire period January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007; we rank
each security by the average ONSR over the interval and allocate those with any FTDs to deciles
1 (lowest average ONSR) through 10 (highest average ONSR). 30 securities for which we have
complete data over the entire time interval
28 are then randomly selected from each decile. Hence,
our first sample covers the first half of 2007 and contains 300 securities. We call this the ‘2007
Overall Sample’.
28 As previously mentioned, we focus on securities which were traded over the entire time interval to avoid the
confounding effects of IPO-related FTDs.14
In order to provide insight into the impact of naked shorting when such naked shorting is
particularly heavy, we also focus on the subset of securities in decile 10 of the overall market.
There are a total of 207 securities
29 in this decile, and we select all of these securities without
any sampling, and they constitute our ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’.
In order to investigate changes in the impact of manipulative naked short-selling, we also
investigate a period before Regulation SHO and a period covering the financial crisis, albeit only
for analyses that can be done without covered or total short-sales data. In this context, we
analyze, first, a ‘pre-SHO’ ‘2004 Most Naked Shorted sample’ based on the period April to
October 2004
30, and second, a ‘financial crisis’ ‘2008 Most Naked Shorted sample’ based on the
period January to June 2008; both constructed in a manner analogous to our ‘2007 Most Naked
Shorted sample’.
5.2 Preliminary Analyses
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of Outstanding Naked Short
Ratio and New Naked Short Ratio for our main 2007 sample period, and also for the 2008
financial crisis period, for all NYSE stocks of US-incorporated firms included in the TAQ
database during the respective six month periods. In addition, given regulatory and media
concern about naked shorting of financial stocks in 2008, the table separately reports these
descriptive statistics for the subset of financial stocks in 2008. We are also able to calculate and
report the Naked to All Shorts Outstanding Ratio for the 2007 sample period, but we are not able
to do so for 2008, since Regulation SHO data on total shorts is not available after June 30, 2007.
For our 2007 sample period, across the universe of NYSE-listed stocks, outstanding
naked shorted shares are, on an average, only about 0.1% of overall shares outstanding and
about 3.5% of all outstanding short positions; even the 99
th percentiles of the distributions are
only 1.5% and 31% respectively. New short sales account for about 1.0% of overall trading
volume but are as high as 19.3% for the 99
th percentile. But, surprisingly, naked short selling did
not intensify during the financial crisis of 2008. Both outstanding and new naked shorts decline
in the first half of 2008. They decline further in the latter half of 2008, though that is not
surprising given the increased restrictions on naked shorting over that period.
Interestingly, overall averages of naked short selling measures for financial stocks, those
most hit by the 2008 financial crisis, albeit slightly higher, are not very different from similar
29 Share code 10 and 11 only, NYSE listed over the entire period.
30 We focus on the period April to October 2004 as that is the earliest 6-months period during which data on fails to
deliver is available to us.15
averages for the sample of all stocks, both in 2007 and in 2008. However, the 90
th and 99
th
percentiles approximately double in 2008 from their 2007 values, suggesting that naked short
selling did increase during the financial crisis for the subset of the most naked shorted securities.
Table 3B presents descriptive statistics that shed first light on the interrelationship
between naked shorting and different metrics of pricing error. Along with the 10 deciles of our
‘2007 Overall Sample’, we include 30 securities randomly selected from the set of NYSE
securities with no naked shorts in that period. This group is called Decile 0. In Table 3B,
average ONSR increases monotonically across deciles by construction, but the increase is
dramatic from 0.05% for Decile 9 to 0.49% for Decile 10. The New Naked Short Ratio increases
in the same way. Covered Short Ratio also increases monotonically across ONSR deciles,
indicating that securities with high naked shorting also have high covered shorting. Interestingly,
the average pricing errors and the proportion of positive pricing errors increase across deciles,
indicating positive correlation, and that naked short selling is greater for overpriced securities,
and inconsistent with media suggestions that naked short-selling depresses stock prices below
their fundamental value. Spread and Share Turnover are increasing across deciles and highest
for the most naked shorted securities; similarly, the average Order Imbalance is also positive for
all deciles, and the highest for deciles 9 and 10. These results indicate that naked short sellers
are, in fact, net providers of liquidity, shorting shares when there is an excess demand on the
long side. Larger firms have less naked shorting, though, clearly, there are also a large number
of small firms in the no-naked-shorting sample. Finally, we observe that institutional ownership
declines across deciles, indicating that firms with high institutional shareholding have less naked
shorting. As institutional shareholding and firm size have often been used as a proxy for the ease
of shorting, for example by Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), our results appear to indicate that
naked short selling increases when short selling is difficult or expensive.
For further preliminary exploration of the interrelationships that appear to exist in Table
3B, between naked short selling, covered short-selling, pricing error and order-imbalance, we
focus on the ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’. For each security in this sample, we identify
the day on which naked short selling is at its highest and label this day as event ‘day 0’. Relative
to this “event date”, we compute our metrics of interest for each day and for each security from
day -20 to day +20, standardize each market quality metrics by security
31, and finally, average
the standardized metrics across securities. Figure 2 is a plot in event time of standardized values
31 In order to standardize variables, we compute security-specific means and standard deviations. We subtract the
security-specific mean from each daily observation; and then divide the resulting number by the security-specific
standard deviation.16
of the Outstanding Naked Short Ratio, the Covered Short Ratio, the Pricing Error Volatility,
Spread, and the Order Imbalance. The plots clearly show that abnormally high naked shorting
follows spikes in covered short selling, and importantly, also in pricing error volatility. The
latter indicates that naked short-sellers are, on average, functioning as value-arbitrageurs by
reducing pricing error as a result of their actions. Order imbalances appear positive prior to the
peak in naked short selling, but decline immediately afterwards, indicating that naked short-
sellers are providing liquidity by shorting shares when there is an excess demand on the long
side.
5.3 Naked Short-Selling and Returns
Over long horizons spanning several weeks or months, our Figure 1 indicates that higher
long horizons returns are associated with relatively lower naked shorting. But, contrary to
Hypotheses H1, and to media rhetoric and popularly held pre-conceptions, our preliminary
daily-horizon analysis above does not indicate any association between naked short-selling and
short-horizon (negative) returns. In fact, naked short-sellers appear to be active when securities
are over-priced, and appear to be reducing these positive pricing errors towards zero rather than
further amplifying already negative pricing errors.
We investigate the relationship between naked short-selling and short-horizon returns
more formally in this sub-section. Given that covered shorting is correlated with naked shorting,
it is necessary to add covered shorting as a control variable. We accordingly use a vector
autoregressive model (hereafter VAR) to test for causality between naked short selling, covered
short selling and returns over a daily horizon, while controlling for the endogenous interrelations
between those variables. The variables we include are changes in New Naked Short Ratio,
Covered Short Ratio, and Return. Accordingly, the system of three equations that we estimate is
formally described in Table 4.
We estimate the VAR model in Table 4 separately for each security. All variables are
standardized by subtracting the security-specific mean and dividing by the security-specific
standard error, and then winsorized at three standard deviations from the mean. Using the Box-
Jenkins procedure, we determine that it is most appropriate to use a VAR of order one. In order
to draw inferences about true population parameters, we employ a Fama and MacBeth (1973)-
type procedure: after estimating parameters by security, we compute a cross-sectional average of
the parameter estimates; and significance is tested by computing the cross-sectional standard
error of the parameter estimate.17
Parameter estimates and tests for significance for this vector autoregressive model are
presented in Table 4 Panel A and Table 4 Panel B for the ‘2007 Overall Sample’ and the ‘2007
Most Naked-Shorted Sample’ respectively. Our results show that, consistent with our earlier
results in Table 2 and Section 4.1, there is strong and significant positive feedback between
naked shorting and covered shorting. However, while changes in returns are highly negatively
related to lagged covered short selling for the overall sample, we do not find any significant
relationship between returns and lagged naked short selling for either of the samples. Overall,
we do not find any evidence that naked short selling depresses stock prices in the short-term.
5.4 Naked Short-Selling and Market Quality
5.4.1 Main Results
Consistent with Hypotheses H2, H3, H4, and H5, our exploratory results in Section 5.2 suggest
that naked short-sellers act as value arbitrageurs (naked short selling intensifies when pricing
errors are positive) and as liquidity suppliers (naked short selling intensifies when order
imbalances are positive). We investigate the relationship between naked short-selling and
measures of market quality more formally in this sub-section. To test for causality while
controlling for endogenous interrelations, we use two VAR models, with additional exogenous
variable(s). The system of equations underlying each of these models is formally specified in
Table 5.
In VAR Model 1, our VAR variables are changes in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio,
Covered Short Ratio, Pricing Error, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance. In addition, we
add two exogenous variables. In the pricing error equation, we add, as a predictor, an interaction
between lagged changes in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and a binary variable set equal to one
when lagged pricing error is positive. Accordingly, we are able to separately estimate the impact
of naked short selling on pricing error when the pricing error is positive in contrast to when the
pricing error is negative. We add one more predictor to the equation in which the change in
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio is the response variable: a binary variable set equal to one when
order imbalance is positive and zero otherwise. This allows us to check whether positive order
imbalances lead to a higher incidence of naked short selling.
In VAR Model 2, we replace Pricing Error by Pricing Error Volatility, or effectively the
absolute value of the Pricing Error. Hence, in this Model 2, our VAR variables are changes in
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio, Covered Short Ratio, Pricing Error Volatility, Volatility,
Spread and Order Imbalance. In addition, we add one more predictor to the equation in which
the change in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio is the response variable: we add a binary variable18
set equal to one when order imbalance is positive and zero otherwise. This allows us to check
whether positive order imbalances lead to a higher incidence of naked short selling.
We estimate VAR Model 1 and VAR Model 2 in Table 5 separately for each security.
For both Model 1 and in Model 2, the results we report in Table 5 are based on standardizing all
variables by subtracting the security-specific mean and dividing by the security-specific standard
deviation, and then winsorizing at three standard deviations from the mean, as before. Using the
Box-Jenkins procedure, we determine that, for both Model 1 and Model 2, it is most appropriate
to use a VAR of order one. In both cases, in order to draw inferences about the true population
parameters, we compute a weighted cross-sectional average of the parameter estimates, with
weights inversely proportional to associated standard errors. Statistical significance is tested by
averaging firm-specific t-statistics in the cross-section. It is assumed that the cross-sectional
distribution of the t-statistics is approximately normal, and the cross-sectional standard error of
the t-statistic is employed in significance testing.
We estimate VAR Model 1 and VAR Model 2 for both our ‘2007 Overall Sample’ and
our ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’. We find that the sign and the significance of the
various inter-relationships involved are economically reasonable for both samples. For
compactness, ease of interpretation, and to preserve the focus on the specific equations of
interest to us, we report in Table 5 only those relationships that are relevant to the issues
addressed in the paper. In particular, first, we report, for both models and for both samples, the
determinants of naked short-selling, i.e. how each of our explanatory variables impact on naked
short-selling after controlling for endogenous interactions. And second, we report, for both
models and for both samples, the effects of naked short-selling, i.e. how naked short-selling
impacts on each of our explanatory variables after controlling for endogenous interactions. We
document several results of considerable economic significance.
Across both Panel A and Panel B: consistent with our earlier results, there is strong and
significant positive feedback between covered shorting and naked shorting. Lagged changes in
the Covered Short Ratio are positively related to changes in the Outstanding Naked Short Ratio,
and vice-versa; i.e., an increase in covered shorting is likely to lead to an increase in naked
shorting, and vice-versa. This suggests that the two trading techniques are complementary rather
than substitutes.
From Panel A alone: first, when order-imbalance is positive, i.e., when there are more
buyers relative to sellers, an increase in order imbalances leads to a significant increase in naked
short selling, which is consistent with naked short sellers providing liquidity, when such
liquidity-supply is needed. Second, when order-imbalance is negative, i.e., when there are more19
sellers relative to buyers, an increase in order imbalances leads to a decrease in naked short
selling, albeit at marginal levels of significance for the overall sample. This is definitely not
consistent with naked short-sellers manipulatively reinforcing selling pressure (with the aim of
driving down prices), and is again consistent with a liquidity-related perspective in trading
decisions – where the naked short-seller reduces costs by entering the market when liquidity-
related conditions are favorable, selling more when there is relatively greater buying pressure,
and selling less when there is relatively greater selling pressure. Third, that the naked short-
seller’s decision is driven largely by a liquidity-related perspective is again shown by the finding
that, for the most naked-shorted sample, irrespective of specification, naked short-selling is
significantly lower when spreads are relatively higher; and by the fact that neither pricing error
nor volatility drive naked shorting in any specification.
From Panel B alone: first, when pricing error is positive, naked short-selling significantly
reduces pricing error in both samples, consistent with an increase in pricing efficiency and with
naked short-sellers functioning as value arbitrageurs. Second, when pricing errors are negative,
naked short selling increases pricing errors significantly in the overall sample, i.e. drives them
towards zero, and hence reduces the magnitude of the pricing error: again the implication is that
naked short selling, on average, improves pricing efficiency. Third, though the second effect
(corresponding to negative pricing errors) is weaker for the most naked-shorted sample, naked
short-selling significantly reduces the volatility of pricing errors in this most naked-shorted
sample again consistent with an increase in pricing efficiency. Fourth, again consistent with
improved pricing efficiency, an increase in naked shorting reduces stock return volatility in the
most naked shorted sample in both estimation modeling frameworks. Finally, an increase in
naked shorting reduces bid-ask spreads, thereby improving liquidity, and consistent with the
scenario emerging from Panel A above, that of naked-short-sellers functioning effectively as
liquidity suppliers.
5.4.2 Economic Significance
Since the vector autoregressive models we employ are based on standardized variables, it
is often difficult to interpret the economic significance of our results. Accordingly, we translate
the coefficients of interest in Table 5 into impact assessments based on percentage points, by
multiplying each parameter estimate by the standard error of the dependent variable. To further
highlight the impact of those changes, we also divide the parameter estimate by the mean value
of the related variable.20
Based on the ‘2007 Overall Sample’, we find that a one percentage point increase in the
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio leads, approximately, to a 3% to 4% reduction (depending on
model) in the volatility of 5-minute returns, a 1% reduction in bid-ask spreads, a 50% decline in
order imbalances and a 3.5% decline in pricing error volatility. The impact on pricing error
points to a 30% decrease in the magnitude of negative pricing errors and a 7% decrease when
pricing error is positive.
An analysis of economic significance of parameter estimates based on the ‘2007 Most
Naked Shorted Sample’ leads to similar results. The estimated reduction in volatility is of a
similar magnitude, ranging from 2.8% to 3.8%. The reduction in bid-ask spreads is also of a
similar magnitude (around 1%). The reduction in order imbalances is more modest: a one
percentage point increase in ONSR is associated with a reduction in order imbalance of about
10%. The reduction of pricing error volatility is about 4%. The impact on pricing error is also
more modest: we estimate a decline in pricing error of about 4.5% when pricing error is positive
and an increase in pricing error of about 9% when pricing error is negative.
5.4.3 Robustness
As discussed above, we estimate the vector autoregressive models by security. In order
to draw population-wide inferences, we use a Fama and MacBeth (1973)-type of cross-sectional
aggregation. In unreported results, we also perform a nonparametric analysis of our parameter
estimates. In particular, we check whether the proportion of positive (negative) parameter
estimates is consistent with the results of our Fama and Macbeth-style aggregation. We find that
results of this nonparametric analysis are totally consistent with the results reported above.
We also repeat our analysis without standardizing and winsorizing our data. When
attempting to then estimate the vector autoregressive models, we are unable to converge to a
solution for almost half of our sample, primarily because of large disparities in the magnitude of
the elements of the associated error variance-covariance matrix induced by the presence of
outliers. However, for those cases for which we are able to estimate the vector autoregressive
models, our results are completely consistent with the analysis conducted with standardized and
winsorized data.
Finally, we also estimate the vector autoregressive models by including only the ten
securities with the highest average Outstanding Naked Short Ratio in our sample. The results
obtained are qualitatively similar to those for the ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’.
5.4.3 Bottom-Line21
In conclusion, our results in this sub-section considerably reinforce our preliminary
results, and do so much more unequivocally, and provide strong support to Hypotheses H2, H3,
H4, H5 and H6. Naked short-sellers appear to have a considerably positive effect on market
quality, first by enhancing pricing efficiency through correction of security overvaluation and
reduction of volatility, and second by providing and improving liquidity through reduction of
order-imbalances and bid-ask spreads
32.
5.5 Naked Short Selling and the 2008 Financial Crisis
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the media has consistently pointed an
accusing finger at naked short-sellers, blaming them for having caused, or at least accelerated,
sharp declines in stock prices, particularly of financial firms. Naked short-sellers have typically
been thought of villains who have deliberately undertaken “bear raids” to drive the price down,
create conditions that trigger credit downgrades, and profit from the downward price spiral and
the eventual collapse of the financial institutions involved. In this context, in this sub-section, we
examine two questions. First, is there any naked-shorting linked evidence of manipulative “bear-
raid” type activity prior to the price crashes associated with four important casualties of the 2008
financial crisis – Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG and Merrill, or were the naked short-sellers just
following rational value-based strategies in response to public information? Second, is there any
evidence of naked short-selling having triggered credit downgrades, or did significant naked
short selling take place in response to a credit downgrade?
5.5.1. Bear Stearns
The first large financial casualty of the 2008 financial crisis was Bear Stearns, the fifth
largest investment banking firm in the nation at the time of its demise. We analyze naked short
selling on the days preceding and immediately following the dramatic loss of market value that
led to the demise of the firm. We compute Outstanding Naked Short Ratio for Bear Stearns on
each trading day from January 1 to March 28, 2008. We also compute for the same period, as a
control variable, an equal weighted average Outstanding Naked Short Ratio for four other
financial institutions with the same primary SIC code as Bear Stearns, and with the closest
32 We do not make comparative inferences between covered versus naked short selling because our research design
is based only on naked-shorting deciles (and not on covered shorting deciles), and the role of the covered shorting
variable is only that of a control variable.22
market value as of the end of the fiscal year 2007
33. We calculate the difference test for its
statistical significance each day
34. Our results are presented in Table 6A.
Figure 3 provides a time-line about the crisis. Outstanding suspicions about liquidity
problems at Bear Stearns started being reported in the media from March 10 onwards, and also
reports that the company’s management was repeatedly denying rumors about problems. The
first major price-crash took place on Friday March 14, when the price per share dropped from
$57 to $30 after a 9 a.m. announcement that Bear would receive an unprecedented loan from the
Federal Reserve System
35. Two days later, on Sunday March 16, JP Morgan proposed buying
Bear Stearns for $2 per share
36. When markets opened on March 17, a second major price crash
materialized, and the price dropped to a close of $4.81.
Table 6A and Figure 3 show that, up to March 11, abnormal naked short selling (i.e. our
difference metric above) was statistically insignificant or significantly less than “normal”. While
naked short selling did increase significantly on March 12 and 13, the increase was tiny relative
to what took place on or after March 14, and also tiny from an economic perspective, with
outstanding naked shorted shares less than 0.5% of shares outstanding until market close on
March 13. Naked shorting increased massively and rapidly only on March 14 and on March 17,
reaching 1.12% (t-stat. 20.7) and 6.9% (t-stat. 137.3) respectively, but even at this level the
number of outstanding naked short shares was not high enough to cause an economically
significant distortion in the supply of shares. More importantly, given that the Fed
announcement was at the start of trading, this increase in naked shorting was subsequent to the
announcement and the consequent precipitous price-drop. Meanwhile, the company’s
management appeared to happily reinforce rumors that the price collapse happened because of
naked-shorting
37. Yet, the abnormal incidence of naked short selling did not precede the price
decline; rather, the decline in stock price was triggered by well-identified events. By the time
naked short selling spiked on March 17, the company was already negotiating a distress sale.
Even in this extreme scenario, often cited as a glaring example of the negative role of
naked short sellers in financial markets, we fail to find any evidence of naked short sellers
engaging in manipulative “bear-raid” type activity. Rather, they appeared to be following
33 The four control stocks are: Raymond James Financial Corporation, Ameritrade Holdings Corporation,
Ameriprise Financial Inc. and Charles Schwab Corporation.
34 We construct a t-statistic for the difference in means as follows: we compute the mean and standard error of this
difference over the time interval January 1
st to February 15
th, 2008; we subtract this historic mean from the daily
difference and then divide the resulting number by the historic estimate of the standard deviation of the difference.
35 “Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns in Bid to Steady Financial System Storied Firm”, The Wall Street Journal
(March 15, 2008).
36 “JP Morgan Chase to Acquire Bear Stearns”, J.P. Morgan News Release (March 16,2008).
37 “Short Sellers Aren’t Jackals, They’re Bears, Fleckenstein Says”, Bloomberg.com (October 29, 2008).23
rational value-based strategies in response to public information The decline in stock price
appears motivated by unrelated and clearly identifiable factors; and consistent with our previous
results, naked short sellers are facilitating price discovery, rather than increasing pricing errors.
5.5.2 Lehman.
The second notable casualty of the financial crisis of 2008 was Lehman. To investigate
the link between naked short selling and the stock price crash, we employ the same method we
used for Bear Stearns. We analyze naked short selling on the days surrounding the dramatic loss
of market value of the firm on September 9, 2008. We identify four other financial institutions
(having the same primary SIC code as Lehman) with the closest market value as of the end of
the fiscal year 2007. We then compute daily an equal weighted average Outstanding Naked
Short Ratio for those benchmark institutions and subtract it from the Outstanding Naked Short
Ratio of Lehman, and test for the statistical significance of the difference
38. Our results are
presented in Table 6B. In Figure 4A we present a graphical summary of the relationship between
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and stock price for the period spanning January 2008 to
Lehman’s bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. We offer a closer look at the period surrounding
Lehman’s bankruptcy in Figure 4B.
Aside from a spike in naked short selling on August 25, our results indicate abnormally
low naked short selling in the days leading to September 9, with abnormal Outstanding Naked
Short Ratio at around 0.01%. While the intensity of naked short selling increases on September
9, abnormal Outstanding Naked Short Ratio is still less than 0.1%. It is only after September 10
that abnormal Outstanding Naked Short Ratio increases dramatically, breaching 2% on
September 11 and 4% on September 17
th.
Our Outstanding Naked Short Ratio plots reveal that naked short selling of Lehman’s
stock intensified after September 9, 2008, just prior to the firm’s bankruptcy. But we should note
that, by September 9, the firm’s stock price had already lost approximately 87% of its value as
of the beginning of the year. The biggest single-day price drop, about 45%, occurred on
September 9, following news that talks with the Korea Development Bank, previously rumored
to be considering a 25% stake in Lehman, had failed. While Outstanding Naked Short Ratio
increases on that day, outstanding naked short shares still represent less than 0.08% of shares
38 We construct a t-statistic for difference in means as follows: we compute the mean and standard error of this
difference over a period starting on January 1
st, 2008 and ending 20 trading days prior to September 9
th, 2008; we
subtract this historic mean from the daily difference and then divide the resulting number by the historic estimate of
the standard deviation of the difference.24
outstanding. On September 11, as shareholders rejected a rescue plan by management, the stock
price fell by an additional 42% and Outstanding Naked Short Ratio further increased to 1.6%.
Over the following days, talks of a possible acquisition by Bank of America and Barclays failed,
triggering further declines in stock price and an increase in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio to
2.4%; and on September 15
th, Lehman announced its bankruptcy.
A recent article in Bloomberg
39 notes that a rumor about Barclays Plc buying Lehman
for a 25% discount to market value was responsible for a 11% fall in Lehman’s stock price on
June 30th. We find that Outstanding Naked Short Ratio spikes to 6 bps (from 0.06 bps) on June
27th. The irregular spike in Outstanding Naked Short Ratio on the day preceding the rumor is
suspicious, and does hint towards a manipulative trading strategy, but is still miniscule, and
certainly not enough to bring down Lehman.
In sum, our analysis shows that, first of all, the incidence of naked short selling, even at
its peak, was too low to justify the decline in price that took place. Second, our analysis
indicates that naked short selling intensified after the stock had lost most of its value and in
reaction to negative news about the company, which is inconsistent with stock price
manipulation.
5.5.3 Merrill
We analyze the relationship between Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and the stock price
for Merrill in Figure 5. We note that the stock price decline of Merrill Lynch is fairly gradual
through the year and is not accompanied by any significant increase in the intensity of naked
short selling. The Outstanding Naked Short Ratio reaches its highest value on October 14
th,
2008, at 0.092%, and that is economically minuscule. Given that naked shorting remains so
small all through the period, we do not engage in any formal statistical testing. There is clearly
no evidence of naked-shorting linked manipulation.
5.5.4 AIG
We analyze the relationship between Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and the stock price
for AIG in Figure 6. The company lost about 40% of its market value by the end of August
2008, amid piling losses on its CDS portfolios. The largest single-day price drop is observed on
September 15, 2008. On that day, Standard & Poor’s cut AIG’s credit rating due to "the
combination of reduced flexibility in meeting additional collateral needs and concerns over
39 “Naked Short Sales Hint Fraud in Bringing Down Lehman”, Bloomberg (March 19, 2009).25
increasing residential mortgage-related losses”. Following the announcement, the company’s
stock price dropped by about 60%. Yet, the intensity of naked short selling remained low, with
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio reaching its year high at 0.16% on September 29, 2008. Once
again, given that naked shorting remains so small all through the period, we do not engage in
any formal statistical testing. There is clearly no evidence of naked-shorting linked
manipulation.
5.5.5. Naked Short Selling and Credit Rating Downgrades
Naked short-sellers have been alleged to engage in (manipulative) naked short selling by
creating conditions that trigger credit downgrades specifically to profit not just from the
downward price spiral but also from linked credit default swap positions on the associated stock.
In this context, we examine naked short selling around credit rating downgrades for a sample of
the most affected financial securities. As our sample of financial firms, we use the 17 securities
(as in section 5.5.6 later) for which the SEC had issued an emergency order temporarily banning
naked short selling in mid-2008
40. To that list, we add Bear Stearns that had not been included in
the SEC emergency order temporarily banning naked short selling, but was clearly affected by
the crisis. Also, we exclude Lehman, as its credit rating downgrade was soon followed by a
bankruptcy. For this sample of companies, we identify 21 long term issuer downgrades by S&P
over the year 2008.
For each downgrade, we compute Outstanding Naked Short Ratio for the security of
interest for 40 trading days preceding and following the announcement. We then compute
average Outstanding Naked Short Ratio for each day in the event day calendar, where day 0 is
the day of the downgrade. We compute abnormal daily Outstanding Naked Short Ratio by
subtracting the average Outstanding Naked Short Ratio computed over 100 trading days ending
20 days prior to the credit rating downgrade. We report results for various event windows. We
compute Cumulative Abnormal Outstanding Naked Short Ratio as the sum of daily Outstanding
Naked Short Ratio for all days in the event window. The Mean Cumulative Abnormal
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio is the cross-sectional average of the security-specific Cumulative
Abnormal Outstanding Naked Short Ratio. The t-statistic for significance of the mean is
computed making use of the historic estimate of the standard error adjusted for date clustering
(and computed over the estimation period of 100 trading days ending 20 days prior to the credit
rating downgrade). The results are reported in Table 7.
40 See Security and Exchange Commission Release No. 58166, July 15
th, 2008. The emergency order was initially
set to expire on July 29
th, 2008, but was later on extended.26
We find that naked short selling is abnormally low in the days preceding the credit rating
downgrade, and not abnormally high as would be expected on the basis of manipulative naked
shorting creating conditions that trigger the downgrade. Consistent with a rational value-
maximizing position, naked short selling is abnormally high in the days following the
downgrade. This abnormal naked shorting is sustained for approximately one month following
the rating downgrade. This evidence is consistent with naked short sellers reacting to negative
news regarding the company, rather than with a manipulative intent, as per our hypothesis H7B.
5.6. The Impact of Restrictions on Naked Short Selling
On July 15, 2008, the SEC issued an emergency order banning naked short sales of the
stocks of 19 publicly traded financial institutions
41. The emergency order took effect on July 21,
2008 and expired on August 12
th, 2008. We examine the impact of those restrictions on stock
price returns and on various market quality metrics. Given our previous results indicating that
naked short selling appears to have positive effects on market quality, we expect deterioration of
the latter in the presence of a ban on naked short selling.
We obtain data from CRSP for 17 of the 19 affected securities
42. We find a matched
sample as follows: we start from the universe of firms listed on CRSP as of January 1, 2008; for
each one of our target securities, we identify common equity of the firm sharing the same SIC
code with the closest market capitalization to that of our targets (as of January 1, 2008). Then,
for each of the 34 securities (the 17 affected securities and the 17 unique matches) and for each
day in the interval January 1, 2008 to September 9, 2008, we compute the Outstanding Naked
Short Ratio, Pricing Error Volatility, Spread and Volume, as defined in Table 1. We also
compute daily Close-to-Close Returns. We average each of these 5 variables to obtain a daily
mean for the affected sample (as the average of the daily metrics for the 17 affected securities)
and a daily mean for the control sample. We then run 5 separate OLS regressions; in each
regression, the response variable is the affected sample mean of either Outstanding Naked Short
Ratio, Pricing Error Volatility, Volume, Spread or Close-to-Close Return, while the explanatory
variables include an intercept, the control sample mean of the variable of interest and a binary
variable, Event, set equal to 1 on all days during which restrictions were in place and equal to 0
on all other days. Our results, presented in Table 8, indicate that the number of naked short
41 BNP Paribas Securities Corp., Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group,
Daiwa Securities Group Inc., Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank ADS,
HSBC Holdings PLC ADS, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae.
42 The common equity of both BNP Paribas Securities Corp. and Daiwa Securities Group Inc. trades over the
counter; the CRSP database does not include over the counter securities.27
shares outstanding declines during the ban, as expected. Yet, we observe lower trading volumes
and higher spreads (both significant at the 1% level); both results are in line with our
expectations (respectively, hypotheses H8A and H8B), indicating that a ban on naked short
selling impacts the stock’s liquidity. We also document higher pricing error volatility, indicating
that restrictions on naked short selling hamper the price discovery process (hypothesis H8C).
Our results include a negative, but not statistically significant, coefficient on the Event binary
variable in the Close-to-Close Return regression, indicating that the ban on naked short selling
failed to slow the price decline of the affected securities, contrary to our hypothesis H8D.
5.7 Manipulative Naked Short Selling
Naked short-sellers can be value arbitrageurs aiming to profit from positive pricing
errors; or liquidity suppliers trading to use lower spreads or higher order imbalances to reduce
their trading costs, or the manipulative traders that Regulation SHO was intended to curb and
regulate. This sub-section focuses on manipulative naked short-selling. The potential benefits of
naked shorting for liquidity suppliers was duly acknowledged by the SEC in their policy
statement prefacing Regulation SHO, and hence, broker-dealers engaged in bona-fide market-
making were exempted from the “locate” requirement. Any naked short-selling should arguably
reduce positive pricing errors anyway, and our findings reflect that expectation. If the “locate”
and “close-out” requirements introduced by Regulation SHO have been effective in curbing
manipulative naked shorting, we would expect that the impact of manipulative naked shorting
would have declined after Regulation SHO, leaving only any beneficial effects on liquidity and
pricing efficiency, and that may potentially be the reason why we find only significantly positive
effects of naked shorting.
It is difficult to include all aspects of “manipulation” in an analysis of “manipulative”
naked shorting; and given the lack of data on daily total short sales prior to January 2005 and
after June 2007, we are unable to compute the Covered Short Ratio and to re-estimate our vector
autoregressive models for any period of time preceding Regulation SHO or during the 2008
financial crisis. Accordingly, we define potentially manipulative naked short-selling from the
mindset of bear-raids, based on whether naked shorting is undertaken at a time when pricing
errors and order imbalances are positive or negative. If naked shorting is undertaken when
pricing errors and order imbalances are positive, then naked short-selling is “healthy” since it
will increase pricing efficiency and provide liquidity respectively. However, in the presence of
greater manipulative naked shorting, we would expect that the mean reversion of pricing errors,
conditional on the pricing error being negative, and the mean reversion of order-imbalances,28
conditional on the order-imbalance being negative, will both decrease. Hence, we base our
inferences on “manipulative” naked shorting on the mean reversion of pricing errors and the
mean reversion of order imbalances, before and after Regulation SHO, and during the 2008
financial crisis.
In order to test how the rate of adjustment of pricing error is affected, we compute the
coefficients of mean reversion for the securities in our ‘2007 Most Naked Shorted sample’, our
‘pre-SHO’ ‘2004 Most Naked Shorted sample’, and our ‘financial crisis’ ‘2008 Most Naked
Shorted sample’, all based on the model for Pricing Error described in Table 9.
To test whether the 2004 and 2008 coefficients of mean reversion, conditional on the
sign of pricing error, are different from the baseline 2007 coefficients, we employ two-sample t-
tests. Our results for the variables of interest are in Table 9. The coefficient for negative pricing
error increases with the introduction of Regulation SHO in January 2005, indicating that prices
revert at a faster rate, in line with our hypothesis H9A, and showing that the impact of
manipulative naked shorting has declined after Regulation SHO; but, consistent with hypothesis
H9C, no significant difference is observed in the coefficient of mean reversion for positive
pricing errors, indicating that the activities of value arbitrageurs are happily unaffected by the
regulation. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in mean reversion, neither for
positive pricing errors nor for negative pricing errors, between 2007 and 2008, indicating that
the financial crisis period did not see an increase in the impact of manipulative naked shorting or
a decrease in the beneficial effects of naked shorting relative to 2007, but did see a significant
decrease in the impact of manipulative naked shorting relative to the period prior to Regulation
SHO
43.
Similarly, we calculate mean reversions for order imbalances for the 2004, 2007 and
2008 most naked-shorted samples based on the OIB equation in Table 9. Our results, also
reported in Table 9, indicate, as expected (Hypothesis H9B), faster mean reversion in order
imbalances after the introduction of Regulation SHO, and significantly more so when order
imbalances are positive. On the other hand, consistent with hypothesis H9D, there are no
significant differences in mean reversion between 2007 and 2008. These findings indicate that
not only has the impact of manipulative naked short-selling declined after Regulation SHO,
naked short-sellers are also making a greater liquidity-related contribution after Regulation
SHO; and furthermore, that the financial crisis period did not see an increase in the impact of
manipulative naked shorting or a decrease in the beneficial effect of naked shorting relative to
43 We do not report a formal test of the difference between 2004 and 2008 for sake of compactness, but the
statistical significance of this difference is very similar to that between 2004 and 2007.29
2007, but did see a significant decrease in the impact of manipulative naked shorting relative to
the period prior to Regulation SHO
44.
6. Conclusions
We document that naked short selling affects a large number of securities. We analyze
the impact of naked short selling on market quality and find that this impact is very positive
overall. On average, naked short sellers function effectively as liquidity providers who reduce
order imbalances, and as value arbitrageurs who stabilize markets and reduce the mispricing of
overvalued securities.
We analyze naked shorting in several financial firms most affected by the financial crisis
of 2008 around the days surrounding their sharpest declines in market value, and find no
significant evidence indicating that the stock price decline was triggered by naked short sellers.
Similarly, by analyzing naked short selling around credit rating downgrades, we find that naked
short sellers react to downgrade announcements rather than trigger them.
We also investigate the market impact of the SEC ban on naked short selling affecting 19
financial securities between July 15
th and August 12
th, 2008. We find higher absolute pricing
errors and lower trading volumes, indicating that a ban on naked short selling hampers the price
discovery process and negatively impacts liquidity. Returns do not appear to be affected,
indicating that the ban on naked short selling failed to slow the price decline of the related
securities.
Finally, we analyze changes in the impact of manipulative naked shorting pre-and-post
Regulation SHO, and during the 2008 financial crisis, and we find that proxies for the impact of
manipulative naked shorting have declined significantly after the introduction of Regulation
SHO, and not changed significantly over the 2008 financial crisis.
Our results are in sharp contrast with the extremely negative pre-conceptions that appear
to exist among media commentators and market regulators in relation to naked short-selling.
While unregulated naked short-selling could be potentially manipulative, and the associated
settlement failures could be somewhat disruptive to the smooth functioning of financial markets,
the duly regulated naked short-selling that has existed after Regulation SHO appears to have
been net beneficial for pricing efficiency and market liquidity, and Regulation SHO also appears
to have successfully curbed the impact of manipulative naked shorting, and this reduction in the
impact of manipulative naked shorting has continued through the 2008 financial crisis.
44 Once again, we do not report a formal test of the difference between 2004 and 2008 for sake of compactness, but
the statistical significance of this difference is very similar to that between 2004 and 2007.30
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Table 1 - Variable Definitions
Table 1 defines the variables used in our analysis. All variables are daily, unless otherwise specified.
Short Selling
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio
(ONSR)
Ratio of estimated outstanding fails to deliver over total shares
outstanding.
New Naked Short Ratio (NNSR) Ratio of estimated number of shares that failed to deliver over trading
volume, in shares.
Naked to All Shorts Ratio Ratio of ONSR over the total number of outstanding shorted shares.
New FTD Estimated number of shares that fail to deliver on a particular day.
Short Ratio Ratio of the total number of shorted shares (both covered and naked) over
shares outstanding.
Covered Short Ratio (CSR) Ratio of estimated covered-shorted shares over trading volume in shares.
Covered-shorted shares are estimated as the difference between the total
number of shorted shares and the estimated number of new FTDs.
Short Volume Number of shares sold short.
Non-Short Volume Number of traded shares minus number of shares sold short.
Pricing Error




A binary variable set equal to 1 if PE is negative and to zero otherwise
Positive Pricing Error (Positive
PE)
A binary variable set equal to 1 if PE is positive and to zero otherwise.
Pricing Error Volatility (PE
Volatility)
The absolute value of the pricing error.
Proportion Positive Pricing
Error
The proportion of days over the sample period during which the pricing
error is positive.
Liquidity Related Metrics
Order Imbalance (OIB) The difference between the market value of shares traded in buyer
initiated trades and the market value of shares traded in seller initiated
trades, divided by total daily dollar trading volume.
Positive OIB A binary variable set equal to 1 if OIB is positive and to zero otherwise
Spread The difference between the last bid and the last ask of the day, divided by
the average of the last bid and last ask of the day
Volume Daily number of shares traded.
Other
Return The daily average of the 5-minute stock price return.
Volatility The standard error of the 5-minute stock price return.
Share Turnover Daily trading volume, in number of shares, divided by total shares
outstanding.
Institutional Ownership The ratio of shares held by institutional investors over total shares
outstanding.
Market Value The number of shares outstanding multiplies by the closing price for the
day.33
Table 2 - New Fails to Deliver and Short Trading Volume.
This table presents results of a regression of New FTD on Short Volume and Non-Short Volume, using a sample of
292 NYSE securities between January and June 2007. We construct the sample as follows: ONSR is computed for
all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) included in the CRSP database over the
entire interval January 1
st, 2007 to June 30
th 2007; daily ONSR is averaged by security; securities with average
ONSR greater than 0 (zero) are ranked by average ONSR and then allocated to deciles 1-10; 30 securities are
randomly selected from each decile for a total sample of 300 securities ( ‘2007 Overall Sample’). The model is
estimated by security; reported results are for 292 securities, as data for 8 securities is incomplete. The reported
results are average parameter estimates. Significance is tested employing the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure.
Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**” indicates significance at the .05
level; “***” indicates significance at the .01 level. All variables are defined as in Table 1. We use OLS regression
to estimate the following equation, with the subscript i being security specific:
t i t i i t i i i t i Volume Short Non Volume Short FTD New , , , 2 , , 1 ,        
Parameter Estimate t-value
Intercept -155.95 -0.20
Short Volume 0.05 4.71 ***
Non-Short Volume <0.01 1.17
R-squared 14.40%34
Table 3A - Summary Statistics of the Incidence of Naked Shorting.
This table presents the mean, median, 90
th percentile (P90) and 99
th percentile (P99) of the distribution of various
metrics of the intensity of naked shorting; all metrics are computed daily for all NYSE common stock of US-based
firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) included in the CRSP and TAQ databases over the entire interval January 1
st,
2007 to June 30
th 2007. All variables are defined as in Table 1.
Panel A: January 2007 to June 2007
Mean Median P90 P99
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio 0.09% 0.00% 0.08% 1.45%
New Naked Short Ratio 0.98% 0.00% 0.67% 19.34%
Naked to All Shorts Ratio 3.47% 0.25% 6.09% 31.03%
Panel B: January 2008 to June 2008
Mean Median P90 P99
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio 0.07% 0.00% 0.14% 1.05%
New Naked Short Ratio 0.87% 0.00% 1.50% 15.17%
Panel C: July 2008 to December 2008
Mean Median P90 P99
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio 0.06% 0.00% 0.09% 0.81%
New Naked Short Ratio 0.73% 0.00% 0.48% 11.24%
Panel D: Financial Companies (SIC: 60 and 61), January 2007 to June 2007
Mean Median P90 P99
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio 0.11% 0.00% 0.10% 1.23%
New Naked Short Ratio 1.18% 0.00% 1.05% 14.08%
Panel E: Financial Companies (SIC: 60 and 61), January 2008 to June 2008
Mean Median P90 P99
Outstanding Naked Short Ratio 0.12% 0.00% 0.26% 2.14%
New Naked Short Ratio 0.95% 0.00% 2.10% 13.49%35
Table 3B - Mean Values by Outstanding Naked Short Ratio Decile.
The sample is built as follows: Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) is computed daily over the period January 1
st, 2007 to June 30
th 2007 for all NYSE common stock;
daily ONSR is averaged by security; securities with average ONSR greater than 0 (zero) are ranked by average ONSR and then allocated to deciles 1-10. 30 securities are
randomly selected from each decile (‘2007 Overall Sample’). An additional 30 securities are selected from the list of NYSE-listed securities included in CRSP with no naked
shorts over the above interval; those securities are allocated to decile 0. Daily statistics are computed, then average statistics are tabulated by security; security averages are
































0.000% 0.00% 1.43% 0.12% 49.81% 0.01% 0.40% 0.40% 0.03 0.12% 33.91% $568
1 0.001% 0.01% 1.20% -0.07% 48.72% 3.97% 0.32% 0.10% 0.00 0.13% 69.05% $16,639
2 0.003% 0.03% 1.34% 0.08% 50.73% 6.68% 0.44% 0.12% -0.01 0.13% 70.49% $12,287
3 0.004% 0.05% 1.19% 0.06% 50.31% 6.79% 0.33% 0.14% 0.05 0.12% 65.58% $14,844
4 0.005% 0.04% 1.56% -0.05% 49.94% 6.53% 0.43% 0.13% 0.02 0.14% 64.20% $5,794
5 0.008% 0.07% 1.46% -0.13% 47.21% 9.15% 0.44% 0.19% -0.03 0.14% 61.91% $4,841
6 0.011% 0.08% 1.59% -0.24% 50.67% 6.20% 0.42% 0.13% 0.00 0.12% 53.12% $6,630
7 0.016% 0.10% 1.19% -0.01% 50.96% 6.23% 0.65% 0.13% 0.03 0.12% 58.68% $3,053
8 0.026% 0.14% 1.63% 0.11% 51.47% 9.74% 0.58% 0.17% 0.06 0.14% 49.58% $2,781
9 0.051% 0.17% 1.56% 0.17% 51.86% 11.48% 0.53% 0.19% 0.04 0.13% 31.26% $1,286
10 0.490% 1.25% 2.47% 0.24% 52.32% 10.64% 0.75% 0.29% -0.05 0.16% 39.35% $1,29236
Table 4 - Naked Short Selling, Covered Short Selling and Returns
This table presents results from the estimation of vector autoregressive models of order one. ONSR is computed for
all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) included in the CRSP database over the
entire interval January 1
st, 2007 to June 30
th 2007. Daily ONSR is averaged by security to obtain Mean ONSR.
Securities with a Mean ONSR greater than 0 (zero) are ranked by Mean ONSR and then allocated to deciles 1-10;
for Panel A, 30 securities are selected from each decile; hence our sample contains 300 securities (‘2007 Overall
Sample’); reported results are for 292 securities, as for 8 securities we did not have sufficient data to estimate the
model. For panel B, we report results for securities in the 10
th decile (intense naked shorting); the 10
th decile
contains 207 securities (‘2007 Most Naked Shorted Sample’); reported results are for 202 securities, as for 5
securities we did not have sufficient data to estimate the model. All variables are standardized and winsorized;
hence parameters estimates are in units of standard deviations of response variables. VARs are estimated by
security. Reported parameter estimates are averages of parameter estimates, by security. Significance is tested
employing the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure; t-statistic is reported in italics, below the parameter estimate.
Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**” indicates significance at the .05
level; “***” indicates significance at the .01 level. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The VAR equation is as
follows:
Panel A – 2007 Overall Sample, 292 Securities
Predictor - Lagged Change
Response - Change NNSR CSR Return
Constant
0.04 0.01 <0.01 0.00 NNSR
6.30*** 3.00*** 1.17 -2.34**
0.07 -0.36 <0.01 -0.01
CSR
6.08*** -52.49*** 0.64 -23.09***
-0.02 -0.02 -0.49 0.00
Return
-1.40 -2.41** -83.79*** 0.26
Panel B – 2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample, 202 Securities
Predictor - Lagged Change
Response - Change NNSR CSR Return
Constant
0.06 0.02 <0.01 0.00 NNSR
6.10*** 5.49*** -1.28 0.45
0.11 -0.37 <0.01 -0.01
CSR
6.30*** -44.86*** -0.94 -18.81***
-0.01 -0.01 -0.50 0.00
Return
-0.59 -0.73 -63.34*** 4.54***
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Table 5 - Summary Results, Determinants and Impact of Naked Short Selling
This table provides results from the estimation of two vector autoregressive models of order one: VAR with Pricing
Error (Model 1) and VAR with Pricing Error Volatility (Model 2). ONSR is computed for all NYSE common stock
of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) included in the CRSP database over the entire interval January 1
st,
2007 to June 30
th 2007. Securities with a Mean ONSR greater than 0 (zero) are ranked by Mean ONSR and then
allocated to deciles 1-10; for the ‘2007 Overall Sample’, 30 securities are selected from each decile; hence our
sample contains 300 securities; reported results are for 292 securities, as for 8 securities we did not have sufficient
data to estimate the model. For the ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’, we report results for securities in the 10
th
decile (intense naked shorting); the 10
th decile contains 207 securities; reported results are for 202 securities, as for
5 securities we did not have sufficient data to estimate the model. All variables are standardized and winsorized;
hence parameters estimates are in units of standard deviations of response variables. The panels are extracts of
results obtained from Model 1 and Model 2; Panel 1 reports results pertaining to the determinants of ONSR and
Panel 2 reports results pertaining to the impact of ONSR. Reported parameter estimates are weighted averages of
parameter estimates, by security; the weights are inversely proportional to the standard error of the parameter
estimate and they are scaled so that they add to 1. Significance is tested employing a modified Fama and MacBeth
(1973) procedure; t-statistics are reported in italics, below the parameter estimate. Significance is denoted as
follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**” indicates significance at the .05 level; “***” indicates
significance at the .01 level. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The VAR equations are as follows:
Model 1 (with Pricing Error)
Model 2 (with Pricing Error Volatility)
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Panel A - Determinants of Naked Short Selling
Predictors - Lagged Changes Other Predictors
Sample ONSR CSR PE PE Volatility Volatility Spread OIB Positive Lag OIB Constant
0.050 0.011 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.027 -0.018 2007 Overall
292 securities 6.74*** 2.98*** 1.11 0.40 -1.18 -0.99 3.29*** -3.46***
0.062 0.018 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 0.033 -0.020 2007 Most Naked Shorted
202 securities 6.76*** 4.89*** -0.22 -0.51 -2.02** -1.40 3.88*** -3.72***
0.0487 0.0096 -0.0017 0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0031 0.0256 -0.0164 2007 Overall
292 securities 6.79*** 2.75*** -0.56 0.43 -0.9 -1.23 3.25*** -3.36***
0.062 0.017 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 0.032 -0.020 2007 Most Naked Shorted
202 securities 6.85*** 4.65*** 0.37 -0.72 -1.75* -1.68* 3.97*** -3.84***





when lag PE > 0)
PE Volatility Volatility Spread OIB
0.050 0.068 0.023 -0.052 -0.014 -0.006 -0.035 2007 Overall
292 securities 6.74*** 5.92*** 1.80* -2.84*** -1.38 -0.63 -2.81***
0.062 0.108 0.015 -0.053 -0.029 -0.033 -0.020 2007 Most Naked Shorted 202
securities 6.76*** 6.05*** 0.84 -2.06** -2.01** -2.57** -1.20
0.049 0.069 -0.010 -0.020 -0.007 -0.034 2007 Overall
292 securities 6.79*** 6.06*** -1.04 -1.97** -0.80 -2.73***
0.062 0.102 -0.030 -0.039 -0.032 -0.018 2007 Most Naked Shorted
202 securities 6.85*** 5.68*** -2.26** -2.73*** -2.59*** -1.0639
Table 6A – Behavior of Bear Stern Companies’ (Ticker: BSC) Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) during March, 2008.
ONSR is computed as the ratio between our estimate of outstanding fails to deliver and shares outstanding. Index ONSR is calculated as the equal weighted average of ONSR
of common stock of 4 firms with the same primary SIC code as Bear Stearns Companies (Bear Stearns) and with the market capitalization closest to Bear Stearns as of the
end of the fiscal year 2007. We construct a t-statistic using the mean and standard error of the ONSR difference over the time interval January 1st, 2008 to February 15th,











3/3/2008 77.32 0.15% 0.00% 0.14% -1.24
3/4/2008 77.17 0.07% 0.00% 0.06% -3.16 ***
3/5/2008 75.78 0.07% 0.01% 0.06% -3.20 ***
3/6/2008 69.9 0.12% 0.01% 0.11% -2.11 ***
3/7/2008 70.08 0.06% 0.01% 0.06% -3.32 ***
3/10/2008 62.3 0.06% 0.01% 0.06% -3.32 ***
3/11/2008 62.97 0.14% 0.00% 0.14% -1.39
3/12/2008 61.58 0.58% 0.03% 0.55% 8.36 ***
3/13/2008 57 0.53% 0.03% 0.50% 7.18 ***
3/14/2008 30 1.12% 0.04% 1.08% 20.71 ***
3/17/2008 4.81 6.09% 0.04% 6.04% 137.34 ***
3/18/2008 5.91 5.87% 0.02% 5.85% 132.93 ***
3/19/2008 5.33 5.87% 0.02% 5.84% 132.70 ***
3/20/2008 5.96 5.84% 0.04% 5.80% 131.66 ***
3/24/2008 11.25 6.13% 0.02% 6.11% 139.00 ***
3/25/2008 10.94 7.19% 0.04% 7.14% 163.23 ***
3/26/2008 11.21 5.46% 0.04% 5.42% 122.81 ***
3/27/2008 11.23 5.84% 0.03% 5.81% 131.82 ***
3/28/2008 10.78 6.18% 0.03% 6.14% 139.76 ***
3/29/2008 10.49 6.18% 0.03% 6.14% 139.76 ***40
Table 6B – Behavior of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s (Ticker: LEH) Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) in August and September 2008.
ONSR is computed as the ratio between our estimate of outstanding fails to deliver and shares outstanding. Index ONSR is calculated as the equal weighted average of ONSR
of common stock of 4 firms with the same primary SIC code as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (Lehman) and with the market capitalization closest to Lehman as of the end
of the fiscal year 2007. We construct a t-statistic as using the mean and standard error of the ONSR difference over the time interval starting January 1st, 2008 and ending 20
trading days prior to September 9
th, 2008. Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**” indicates significance at the .05 level; “***”











8/25/2008 13.45 0.16% 0.00% 0.15% 13.98 ***
8/26/2008 14.03 0.08% 0.00% 0.08% 5.30 ***
8/27/2008 14.78 0.08% 0.00% 0.08% 5.08 ***
8/28/2008 15.87 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -3.49 ***
8/29/2008 16.09 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -3.66 ***
9/2/2008 16.13 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -3.43 ***
9/3/2008 16.94 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% -3.24 ***
9/4/2008 15.17 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -4.08 ***
9/5/2008 16.20 0.00% 0.01% -0.01% -4.75 ***
9/8/2008 14.15 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -4.46 ***
9/9/2008 7.79 0.08% 0.02% 0.06% 3.47 ***
9/10/2008 7.25 0.43% 0.02% 0.41% 43.46 ***
9/11/2008 4.22 1.64% 0.02% 1.63% 185.67 ***
9/12/2008 3.65 2.43% 0.02% 2.41% 277.32 ***
9/15/2008 0.21 2.43% 0.02% 2.41% 276.59 ***
9/16/2008 0.30 2.61% 0.08% 2.53% 290.37 ***





Table 7 – Naked Short Selling around Credit Rating Downgrades
We analyze long-term issuer credit rating downgrades by S&P for 17 financial firms: Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Citigroup Inc.,
Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank ADS, HSBC Holdings PLC ADS, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc., Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, over the year 2008. We compute ONSR for each firm’s common
stock (when the primary exchange is not in the US, we use the corresponding ADR). In all, we identify 21 downgrades; day 0 is the day of the downgrade. We compute
abnormal daily ONSR by subtracting the Mean ONSR from daily ONSR. Mean ONSR is computed over 100 trading days ending 20 days prior to the credit rating downgrade.
We report results for various event windows. Cumulative Abnormal ONSR is the sum of daily ONSR for all days in the event window. The t-statistic for significance of the
mean is computed making use of the historic estimate of the standard error (computed over the estimation period of 100 trading days ending 20 days prior to the credit rating
downgrade), adjusted for date clustering. Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**” indicates significance at the .05 level; “***”








(-20,-1) 21 -0.36% -1.93 *
(-10,-1) 21 -0.27% -2.03 **
(-5,-1) 21 -0.15% -1.64
(0,0) 21 -0.02% -0.57
(+1,+5) 21 0.32% 3.44 ***
(+1,+10) 21 0.57% 4.25 ***
(+1,+20) 21 0.67% 3.56 ***42
Table 8 –The Impact of Restrictions on Naked Short Selling imposed by the SEC between July 21st, 2008 and August 12th, 2008.
The following table presents parameter estimates and related t-statistics (in italics, grey font) from 5 OLS regressions, one for each variable of interest: ONSR, PE Volatility,
Volume, Spread and Close-to-Close Return. All variables are computed daily over the interval January 1
st, 2008 to September 9
th 2008. In each k
th (1<= k <= 5) regression,
the response variable is the mean value of the k
th variable of interest for the sample of the 17 stocks that were subject to restrictions on naked short selling. Explanatory
variables include, in each regression, an intercept, the mean value of the k
th variable of interest for the control sample, Control, and a binary variable, Event, equal to 1
between July 21st, 2008 and August 12th, 2008. All variables are defined as in Table 1, with the exception of Close-to-Close Return; Close-to-Close Return is computed as
the difference between the day’s adjusted close price (as reported by CRSP) and the previous day’s adjusted close price, divided by the previous day’s adjusted close price.
Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**” indicates significance at the .05 level; “***” indicates significance at the .01 level. The OLS
























-0.0063 -0.0018 1.1786 Close-to-Close
Return -1.59 -1.42 25.37***
t k t k k k k t k Variable Control Event Variable Response , , , 2 , 1 ,        43
Table 9 –Pricing error and OIB reversals
This table presents results of regressions used to test the difference between the rates of mean reversion of Pricing Error and Order Imbalance between 2004 and 2007, and
2007 and 2008. For 2007, we use our ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’, constructed as in Table 5. We repeat the same procedure for all NYSE common stocks of US-
based firms included in the CRSP database between April 1
st, 2004 and October 1
st 2004 to obtain our ‘2004 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’ which contains 193 securities; and
we obtain results for 188 securities. We repeat the same procedure for all NYSE common stock of US-based firms included in the CRSP database between January 1
st, 2008
and June 30
th 2008, obtaining our ‘2008 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’, which contains 231 securities; and we obtain results for 193 securities. The following two OLS
regressions are conducted for all three samples.
t i t i i t i i t i t i i POS INC t i i NEG i t i Volatility Spread PE Positive Error Pricing Error Pricing Error Pricing , , , 2 , , 1 1 , 1 , , _ 1 , , , *                  
t i t i i t i i t i t i i POS INC t i i NEG i t i Volatility Spread OIB Positive OIB OIB OIB , , , 2 , , 1 1 , 1 , , _ 1 , , , *                  
The regressions are estimated by security (i). The reported results are average parameter estimates (standard errors are reported below, in italics). The difference in parameter
estimates of interest are reported in the table and tested by using a two-sample t-test. Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level “**”
indicates significance at the .05 level; “***” indicates significance at the .01 level. All variables are defined as in Table 1
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Figure 1
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio (ONSR) and Cumulative S&P 500 Returns, January 1






































































































































































































































Figure 2 – Naked Shorting, Covered Shorting, Pricing Error and Liquidity around Naked Shorting Peaks.
Plot of averages of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio, Covered Short Ratio, PE Volatility, Order Imbalance and Spread against a relative date; all series are computed daily by
security, for all securities in the ‘2007 Most Naked-Shorted Sample’. All the variables have been standardized prior to being averaged; average values are plotted. For each





Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Bear Sterns Companies Inc. common stock (ticker: BSC) against calendar date. The Return Index is set to





j BSC i R Index Return
1
1 . j BSC R , is the observed total return for BSC on day j, from the CRSP database.47
Figure 4A
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. common stock (ticker: LEH) against calendar date. The Return Index is set







j LEH i R Index Return . j LEH R , is the observed total return for LEH on day j, from the CRSP database.48
Figure 4B
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. common stock (ticker: LEH) against calendar date. The Return Index is set







j LEH i R Index Return . j LEH R , is the observed total return for LEH on day j, from the CRSP database.Figure 5
Plot of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. common stock (ticker:
MER) against calendar date. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st of January,







j MER i R Index Return . j MER R , is the observed total return for MER on day j, from the CRSP
database.
Figure 6
Plot of averages of Outstanding Naked Short Ratio and Return Index related to American International Group








j AIG i R Index Return . j AIG R , is the observed total return for AIG on day j, from the CRSP database. 
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